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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Emily Anne Sanchirico 
Master of Arts 
Environmental Studies Program 
September 2013 
Title: A Strong Institutional Climate: Regional Trade Networks and Climate Action 
 
 
Climate change has been described as a malign, wicked, and super wicked 
problem. I focus on key characteristics that make international collective action 
challenging: asymmetry, fear of free riding, scientific uncertainty, and inherent 
interdependencies. I argue that an institution designed to tackle such a complex 
problem requires a key set of features: leadership, linkage, quality information, 
differentiated obligations, monitoring/enforcement, transparency, and flexibility. I 
assess the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to determine 
what aspects are missing. I then ask why the European Union, with incentives to the 
contrary, set broad unilateral goals.  I argue that the framework of political and 
economic integration made deep cooperation possible. Lastly, I consider whether this 
experience is specific to the EU and ask whether regional trade networks have a role 
in the global arsenal of climate change solutions.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Climate change, an international problem that transcends political and 
geographic boundaries, cannot be met with a single solution. To date, attempts to 
mitigate its social and environmental externalities have resulted in “a regime 
complex: a loosely coupled set of specific regimes” (Keohane and Victor 2011: 1). 
This thesis considers what role, if any, regional trade agreements may have in that 
network of solutions. I look at the successes and shortcomings of two institutions: 
one global, the other regional. By examining the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Kyoto Protocol (global) alongside the 
European Union’s climate action program (regional), I work to contribute to 
theories of institutional fit (Young 2010). When met with the same problem, climate 
change, why do two different types of institution develop, and why does one work 
better? What conditions help to explain the variation? I describe the problem 
structure of climate change, work through rational design theory to envision an 
ideal institution, and then attempt to determine whether the global or regional case 
study most closely approximates that prototype. 
Climate change is plagued with aspects of upstream/downstream 
asymmetries. In one sense, it is a Tragedy of the Commons: the world has over-taxed 
the atmosphere with greenhouse gas emissions, and all actors are both perpetrators 
and victims. However, because some will not suffer the consequences as greatly, or 
immediately, they do not perceive themselves to be victims, resulting in dynamics 
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more typical of upstream/downstream problems. In the classic Tragedy of the 
Commons model, all actors have mixed motives. They have at least some incentives 
to contribute because, although they would rather not assist, they want to see the 
problem solved. Institutions can suffice with “simple issue-specific reciprocity” 
(Mitchell and Keilbach 2001). With climate change, getting countries to act is more 
complex than demonstrating that it is in everyone’s interest. If countries do not 
identify as victims, they do not have the same incentives to cooperate.  
In part due to this complexity, scholars, and policymakers have deemed 
climate change an inherently malign (Miles et al 2002), wicked (Rittel and Webber 
1973), or super-wicked (Levin et al 2012, Lazarus 2009) problem.  It is a global 
dilemma with numerous actors, and externalities are asymmetric (Mitchell and 
Keilbach 2001). Many of the most immediate costs will be borne by developing 
countries, whose ability to influence international politics is limited. Powerful non-
state actors, such as multinational oil companies, have strong incentives to maintain 
the status quo. The major state players, those in the best position to serve as leaders, 
most notably the United States and China, do not yet appear to see themselves as 
victims, and thus may have the least to gain from cooperation. Adhering to emission 
reductions would force them to alter lifestyles that depend on fossil fuel dependent 
industries. Attempts to form an institution are plagued by uncertainty, free riding, 
compliance, and distribution struggles (Koremenos et al 2001). Engaging countries 
would require a recalibration of the perceived costs and benefits of participation. 
 Given the above scenario, we should expect to see few countries contributing 
to climate change progress unless the entire world has signed on. With the biggest 
 3 
emitters balking at cooperation, others have little incentive to agree to clean up a 
problem that will not go away without full participation. Here I consider the 
European Union (EU) as a theoretical puzzle. Rather than resist further action and 
assuage their fears with the knowledge that their emissions are already lower than 
levels of much of the developed world, why has the EU set broad unilateral goals? A 
simplistic explanation would suggest that their tendency toward ‘green’ politics is 
the sole reason: the Europeans have driven forward climate change cooperation 
because they care. I seek to investigate that assumption. I argue that deep 
integration has been key to EU environmental successes. However, I go beyond 
shared preferences to suggest that it was the framework of the regional trade 
agreement, and economic incentives embedded within, that has allowed the EU to 
push climate change to the forefront of the regional agenda. Indeed, the normative 
argument, that there is a philosophy of environmentalism in Europe, only goes so 
far. The economic and political interdependencies inherent to the EU recalibrated 
the distribution of costs and benefits associated with climate change, resulting in a 
far different negotiation climate than that which would have existed in the absence 
of any institutional arrangement. 
 I seek to identify the factors that facilitated progress in the face of the 
obstacles laid out in the “malign problem structure” section and, separately, to 
assess which, if any, of those factors had to do with the specific forms of trade 
relationships that the EU had fostered (and hence might be transferable to other 
regions and other RTAs) or whether they were independent of those institutional 
developments in Europe. I am then better able to determine why European states, 
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with incentives to do the contrary, have developed concrete frameworks to combat 
climate change, and whether the EU itself is the explanation. I ask what features made 
the EU able/willing to act on climate change, and attempt to assert whether they can 
be attributed to it being a trade agreement. Can RTAs serve as an example of 
“building on the deep economic and political interdependence of modern states to 
enhance compliance”(Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell 1998: 42)? 
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CHAPTER II 
CLIMATE CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING MALIGN PROBLEM STRUCTURE 
 
 In climate change, we find a problem with high costs and benefits that are not 
immediate. When pieced together with asymmetric distribution of both costs and 
benefits, it is evident that cooperation will not come easily. Indeed, getting all 
participants to agree, and making sure that all significant states participate, 
becomes one of the greatest challenges of international collective action (Underdal 
1992). Accordingly, “the more politically malign the problem, the less likely the 
parties will achieve an effective cooperative solution” (Underdal 2002a: 22). It is no 
surprise, then, that climate change has been defined as malign, wicked, and super-
wicked.  
Below, I work to show how each malign characteristic can be paired with a 
strong institutional feature. I focus on fear of free riding, asymmetry, scientific 
uncertainty, and inherent interdependencies. I argue that an institution designed to 
tackle such a complex problem requires a key set of features: transparency, 
monitoring and enforcement, differentiated obligations, information sharing, 
flexibility, leadership, and linkage (Miles et al 2002, Koremenos et al 2001, Brown 
Weiss and Jacobson 1998). I do not suggest that any one of these institutional 
characteristics, taken on its own, is sufficient to create a successful climate regime. 
Rather, they are all necessary components if progress is to meet the quick time 
frame that the problem structure of climate change necessitates. Nor do I suggest 
that any one institution will represent a singular solution. Climate change, a malign 
and complex problem, requires a full network of so-called solutions.  
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Free Riding: Transparency, Monitoring and Enforcement  
In the case of pollution leaking across borders “the worst that can happen to 
an actor contributing unilaterally to the provision of some collective good is that the 
benefits he thereby produces are harvested by others (acting as free riders)” 
(Underdal 2002: 19). The fear of free riding, or cheating, must be met with 
transparent institutions with strong systems for monitoring and enforcement. This is 
necessary when those who cause the problem do not seek to provide a solution 
(Levin et al 2012). Climate change is in many ways a classic Tragedy of the 
Commons. Everyone is both a perpetrator and a victim. Accordingly, all actors must 
trust that others contributing to climate change will work to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. As such, institutions should monitor compliance, and establish clear 
means of enforcement. Here I also return to the issue of capacity, and suggest that 
institutions must consider why an actor does not comply. Countries impacted by 
climate change, but not able to (financially or technically) meet strict environmental 
standards, should have access to assistance. Therefore, I argue for an enforcement 
system that incorporates management by differentiating between different sources 
of noncompliance (Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell 1998, Young 2010, Tallberg 2002). 
In addition, the institution must foster transparency so that all actors know the rates 
of rule conformance of fellow stakeholders (Ostrom 1990). 
 
Asymmetry: Differentiated Obligations 
Malign is defined as “a function of incongruity, asymmetry, and cumulative 
cleavages” (Underdal 2002a: 20). Incongruity can relate to both externalities and 
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competition (Underdal 2002a). Climate change is correlated most closely with the 
former. Asymmetrical distribution of externalities is particularly tricky, a 
characteristic most commonly associated with upstream/downstream situations 
(Mitchell and Keilbach 2001). Rittel and Weber reiterate the malign nature of 
“conflicting stakeholders” (Rittel and Webber 1973). I describe three varieties of 
asymmetry present in the problem structure of climate change: structural, 
economic, and normative. The developed world is responsible for the largest share 
of greenhouse gas emissions to date. Their economies depend on maintaining the 
fossil-fuel status quo. Meanwhile, developing countries assert their right to emit as 
they undergo the same industrialization process that the richer countries have 
already experienced. Here we see an example of a structural asymmetry (Young 
1999: 69). Therefore, differentiated obligations are needed to account for the uneven 
costs and benefits associated with approaching a comprehensive set of solutions to 
climate change. Tit-for-tat (Axelrod 1984), or issue-specific reciprocity (Mitchell and 
Keilbach 2001), is not sufficient. Climate change is further plagued by economic 
asymmetries (Young 1999: 70). All actors are not created equal, and ability to 
comply with a regime varies deeply. Therefore, countries plagued by incapacity may 
need assistance, financial and technical, to comply with new environmental 
regulations (Vogel and Kessler 1998). Lastly, there are clear normative asymmetries 
at play. Actors who historically value environmental regulation (the Nordic 
countries, for example) are in a different situation than their less-affluent 
counterparts (such as Spain or Ireland), who may struggle to reach the high 
standards set by the EU. This last form of asymmetry may offer possibilities for 
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hegemonic-type action on the part of the former. This idea is revisited in the 
leadership section. 
 
Scientific Uncertainty: Information and Flexibility 
Scientific uncertainty makes managing climate change difficult to achieve 
(Underdal 2002a, Rittel and Webber 1973, Levin et al 2012). Indeed, uncertainty 
and malignancy can be a lethal combination (Underdal 2002b). With climate change, 
we see two main forms of uncertainty: uncertainty about behavior and uncertainty 
about the state of the world (Koremenos et al 2001). Dealing with the former relates 
to the fear of cheating and need for enforcement described below. Mitigating the 
latter requires strong mechanisms for sharing scientific and technical knowledge. 
Institutions must facilitate learning and knowledge sharing via systems geared at 
disseminating quality information to mitigate the uncertainty regarding climate 
change. Doing so would require the development or existence of epistemic 
communities (Haas 1992), which relies on the socially constructed character of 
environmental knowledge (Jasanoff 1998). How two countries implement the same 
set of rules may vary greatly, resulting in different sets of technical and social 
controls. How to monitor divergent methods further complicates the international 
environmental arena. There is a need to create “the background conditions under 
which participants will see the need to standardize their own actions in order to 
protect the environment, and thus will come to build global communities of shared 
mission and belief” (Jasanoff 1998: 87).  
 9 
Responding to uncertainty also requires both flexibility mechanisms and 
institutional flexibility (Young 2010). Indeed, flexibility can enhance cooperation 
(Kucik and Reinhardt 2008, Koremenos et al 2001), and “allow institutional creation 
to move forward without fully resolving distribution problems or uncertainty about 
the future state of the world” (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001: 903).  A successful 
climate regime must be able to adapt and change in response to new information or 
unexpected events. In light of scientific uncertainty, flexibility is important “if actors 
learn over time about new technologies and tasks” (Koremenos et al 2001: 1061). A 
rigid strategy would hamper the institution’s ability to adequately respond. 
Adaptive flexibility allows member states “to respond to unanticipated shocks or 
special domestic circumstances while preserving existing institutional 
arrangements” (Koremenos et al 2001: 773).  
 
Inherent Interdependencies: Leadership and Linkage 
The fact that climate change is a global problem, paired with the inherent 
interdependencies (Rittel and Webber 1973) of environmental politics, results in 
hesitation for any one actor to enact change without the rest of the world agreeing 
to do the same. Environmental problems, as evidenced by the case of climate 
change, often do not adhere to geopolitical borders. States are polluting the same 
atmosphere. I return to this claim in assessing why the EU, facing the same set of 
disincentives to act, still chose to push forward concrete policy. A key component 
may be leadership; if powerful member states with more political capital want 
climate change on the agenda, they might have the sway to get it there. I argue, 
 10
however, that the preferences of strong actors do not prove sufficient. Rather, if a 
leader argues for an issue that is palatable, that issue will be considered more 
quickly than it would have been without a clear backer. Making an otherwise-
unpalatable solution to an environmental issue palatable requires linkage. Underdal 
suggests that regimes suited to deal with malign problem must include one or more 
of three characteristics: selective incentives for cooperative behavior, linkages to 
more benign issues, or a system with high problem-solving capacity (Underdal 
2002a: 23).  I argue that linkage can take advantage of inherent interdependencies, 
shifting them from a malign characteristic to one that can enhance cooperation and 
effectiveness. Institutional design can capitalize on shared incentives of countries 
within an institution (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001). 
Fear of free riding, asymmetry, scientific uncertainty, and inherent 
interdependencies make climate change fundamentally challenging to manage. I am 
here interested in Levin’s assertion that “the central authority used to address it is 
weak or non-existent” (Levin et al 2012: 123). I outline below why the UNFCCC fits 
into the ‘weak’ category, and why the EU might do a better job. An institution 
capable of overcoming the obstacles that define climate change would need the 
ability to alter deeply rooted incentives. I work to assess whether the institutional 
features necessary to deal with an acutely malign or wicked problem structure are 
present in the UNFCCC and EU. I move beyond the normative argument, what an 
institution should look like, to how two variations have played out in practice. I ask 
why, when faced with the same malign problem, two institutions have varying 
degrees of success and influence. As I establish where each climate regime fails (and 
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succeeds), I attempt to explain why. I ask which features are due to characteristics of 
the EU, (such as leadership and economic ability to support differentiated 
obligations) or whether there are certain successes that are a result of working 
within the regional trade mechanism (monitoring/enforcement, information, 
flexibility, and linkage). Finally, I try to determine whether the EU succeeds due to 
the former or the latter, and whether its attributes are transferrable. If regional 
trade agreements can contribute to climate change progress, they deserve more 
careful consideration. 
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CHAPTER III 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN PRACTICE: UNFCCC AND EU 
 
Below I attempt to determine which climate regime, the UNFCCC/Kyoto 
Protocol or the EU, more closely approximates the ideal institution outlined above. 
When burdened with the fear of free riding, asymmetry, scientific uncertainty, and 
inherent interdependencies, how does each respond? I look to see whether they 
incorporate transparency, monitoring and enforcement, differentiated obligations, 
information sharing, flexibility, leadership, and linkage. I work to assess why the EU, 
in most cases, performs better than the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol as a means of 
better understanding the dynamics of institutional fit. 
 
Transparency, Monitoring and Enforcement  
UNFCCC 
The UNFCCC, adopted in 1992, set no binding limits on emissions, and did 
not include an enforcement mechanism. The objective of the UNFCCC reads as 
follows: 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments 
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.  Such a level should be 
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achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened 
and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” 
(UNFCCC Article 2) 
The language of the text is vague, but does signal both the need to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentrations and the need to do so within a reasonable 
timeframe. Indeed, the commitments outlined in Article 4 reference almost all of the 
institutional features described above. All countries are required to contribute to 
monitoring and transparency, and are asked to “develop, periodically update, 
publish and make available to the Conference of the Parties, in accordance with 
Article 12, national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol” (UNFCCC 
Article 4:1a). However, in terms of enforcement in the treaty text, there is none. The 
treaty relies on self-reporting (UNFCCC Article 12). Climate change, a game with 
high incentives to cheat, requires more. 
 Recognizing the lack of enforcement, the Conference of the Parities (COP) to 
the UNFCCC designed the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to include binding reductions. 
Thirty-seven developed countries, and the EU, agreed to reduce their emissions to 
an average of 5% below 1990 levels. The first commitment period lasted till 2012, 
with few members reaching their targets. A more ambitious proposal, 18% 
reduction from 1990 levels between 2013 and 2020, is set to begin (Kyoto Protocol, 
2013). Internationally binding emission reductions require the monitoring and 
enforcement that the UNFCCC lacked. The Kyoto Protocol includes a registry system, 
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reporting, and a compliance mechanism. However, it is important to note that 
countries still self-report. The compliance mechanism is an impressive example of a 
noncompliance procedure. It has two branches: facilitative and enforcement. The 
goal is to facilitate compliance, but also determine consequences when intentional 
violations become apparent. The system takes into account the need to combine 
management and enforcement (Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell 1998, Young 2010, 
Tallberg 2002). It does well at differentiating between various reasons for 
noncompliance. Despite these successes, the reliance on self-reporting and lack of 
real consequences cripples the global climate regime. The consequences referenced 
in the enforcement mechanism largely include public notification of noncompliance, 
and the requirement that the member develop a new compliance plan. Indeed, the 
compliance mechanism is not legally binding, and the implementation of 
consequences “requires cooperation by the non-compliant Party” (Halvorssen and 
Hovi 2006: 171).  It quickly becomes clear that the Kyoto Protocol relies heavily on 
voluntary action (Young 2010).   
 
EU 
By 1990, the EU had already made a commitment to stabilize carbon dioxide 
emissions. However, the first real climate change program was not launched until 
2000. The program was a response to the Kyoto Protocol, and fears that the EU 
member states were not on track to meet their targets. It included a proposal for an 
emission-trading scheme, a directive on generating electricity from renewable 
energy sources, and a voluntary agreement with the auto industry to reduce carbon 
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dioxide emissions from cars (Dinan 2010). The second followed in 2005. It brought 
the idea of carbon capture and storage to the agenda (Dinan 2010). Although the EU 
dropped overall emissions by 8.6% by 2005, only Sweden and the UK were actually 
on track to meet their targets. Concerned, the EU enhanced it’s efforts to tackle 
climate change. At the EU summit in March 2007, national leaders committed to 
unilateral cuts of 20% in carbon dioxide emissions (relative to 1990 levels), and 
vowed to increase cuts to 30% if other countries agreed to join an international 
climate agreement.  
To meet that goal, the Commission initiated a new set of legislation in 2008. 
The energy-climate package showcased a 20-20-20 plan. Carbon dioxide emissions 
would be reduced by 20%, renewable energy use would increase by 20%, and 
energy efficiency would improve by 20% (COM (2008) 30 final). All was proposed to 
happen by 2020. The energy-climate agreement “maintains the national targets for 
member states, together with a linear, legally binding trajectory for the period 
2013-2020, including annual monitoring and compliance checks” (Dinan 2010: 
476). In this one sentence we see differentiated obligations, operational goals, and 
monitoring/enforcement; key features for an institution designed to deal with the 
malign problem of climate change.  In addition, the clear operational goals are 
legally binding. The Directorate-General for Climate Action, established in 2010, 
oversees the EU’s Emission Trading System (ETS) and keeps track of the reduction 
targets of all member states.  
The original climate package includes a monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism (Decision No 280/2004/EC). The Decision recognizes that a mechanism 
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is needed to monitor “all anthropogenic emissions”, evaluate progress, and ensure 
“the timeliness, completeness, accuracy, consistency, comparability and 
transparency of reporting” (Decision No 280/2004/EC, Article 1). The mechanism 
thus serves not only as an indicator of progress, but also as a means of 
communicating between member states; successfully mitigating the fear of free 
riding. A 2011 proposal followed up, noting the need to improve the current 
monitoring and reporting system to take into account “the broader scope of the 
legislation [and] the increased number of addressees” (COM (2011) 789 final, 1). 
The new proposal is also a testament to the institutional flexibility of the EU, which is 
addressed below. Member states are allowed to implement the ETS in a manner that 
conforms to their own national contexts, and may adopt their own monitoring 
methodologies (Aakre and Hovi 2010). Concrete penalties exist when permit-
holding industries do not fully cover their emissions: “First, the Directive requires 
publication of the names of noncompliant installations (‘naming and shaming’). 
Second, excess emissions must be oﬀset in the following compliance period. Third, 
installations must pay a ﬁnancial penalty per ton of excess emissions” (Aakre and 
Hovi 2010: 435).  
 
Explanations 
 The EU benefits from the “broadest mandate…widest range of legal 
instruments at its disposal and the highest level of institutionalization” (Boas 2002: 
62). Member states are required to include the full set of climate action into 
domestic legislation; participation is mandatory.  “Member States shall lay down the 
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rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted 
pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that such 
rules are implemented” (EU Emission Trading Directive, Article 16:1). Unlike the 
UNFCCC, compliance is not voluntary. A “member state’s failure to comply with its 
responsibilities may result in enforcement proceedings at the EU level” (Aakre and 
Hovi 2010: 436). The real thrust of enforcement, then, is embedded in the structure 
of required political and economic integration. Climate regulation can be enforced 
because it falls under the full ‘acquis communautaire’ of the EU. Member states are 
required to comply with all EU-wide legislation. Failure to do so can involve strict 
penalties (as seen above in the case of the ETS), shaming, and withdrawal of 
financial assistance.  
 It is clear that “development of the EU-ETS’s potent enforcement system was 
facilitated by pre-existing EU institutions. In particular, the ECJ (European Court of 
Justice) could be used as an enforcer of last resort, should enforcement through 
domestic courts fail. In marked contrast, Kyoto had no corresponding pre-existing 
institutions to rely on for enforcement” (Aakre and Hovi 2010: 438). The 
institutional history of political and economic integration granted the EU authority 
to create legally binding directives, and to require effective monitoring and 
enforcement. In addition, the EU had enforced compliance with the acquis 
communautaire, under which climate change policy falls, for decades. The UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocol had no such history to fall back on, and, indeed, it has been clear 
that the parties to the convention are unlikely to cede any sovereignty to it, making 
a clear system of enforcement challenging. 
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Differentiated Obligations 
UNFCCC 
Under the UNFCCC, developed countries are told to serve as leaders, and 
asked to help developing countries; here we see differentiated obligations (UNFCCC 
Article 3). Indeed, one of the main principles under Article 3 states: 
“The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, 
that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the 
Convention, should be given full consideration” (UNFCCC Article 3: 2). 
However, the provision is vague, and there is no real system to address the issue of 
incapacity. Article 3: 3 states that “policies and measures should take into account 
different socio-economic contexts”, but offers no advice for how. The “mechanism 
for the provision of financial resources on a grant of concessional basis” (UNFCCC 
Article 11) does not explain how developing countries will be able to meet their 
goals. Therefore, although Article 4: 2-10 address differentiated obligations, the 
treaty lacks any real teeth to address the structural, economic, and normative 
asymmetries that are inherent to the problem structure of climate change. There is a 
clear recognition that developed countries need to serve as leaders, and that 
developing countries may need financial assistance, but there is 1) no system 
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established to enforce differentiated obligations and 2) no real mention of capacity 
building.  
 As addressed above, the Kyoto Protocol included several key improvements. 
The compliance mechanism stipulates that “the facilitative branch is to take into 
consideration the common but differentiated responsibilities of the Parties, and the 
circumstances pertaining to questions before it” (An Introduction to the Kyoto 
Protocol Compliance Mechanism, 2013). There is a strong emphasis on “common but 
differentiated obligations”; an effort to put the burden on the biggest perpetrators, 
the developed countries. Strikingly the differentiated obligations of the Kyoto 
Protocol are deeply bifurcated: developing countries actually have no binding 
obligations. Although developing countries are included in the 192 parties to the 
convention, they are not considered Annex I countries, and are not legally bound to 
emission reductions. Articles 2-9 reference obligations that only apply to Annex I 
countries.  
Article 10 is the only one that includes commitments for all parties. Countries 
are told to “Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change 
and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change” (Kyoto Protocol 
Article 10(b)). However, they are more suggestions and have no corresponding 
enforcement mechanism. The Kyoto Protocol does take into account the role of 
developing countries. Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Annex I 
countries can gain credit for an emission reduction project in a developing country. 
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Unfortunately, the CDM does little to alter the issue of technical and financial 
capacity.  
The fact that only developed countries have binding obligations has proven 
troublesome. The third largest emitter, China, faces no limits on its emissions 
(Victor 2006: 91). Non-Annex I countries are growing, and increasingly make up a 
large share of global emissions. The Kyoto Protocol has not yet been revised to 
reflect this new reality. Necessary actors, such as the United States, have, in part, 
refused ratification due to the sentiment established earlier: they will not 
participate if all perpetrators are not included in the agreement. The institutional 
design took into account the fact that developed countries were responsible for the 
greatest share of global emissions. However, failing to include all relevant actors, 
and to consider their potential for growth, turned into a barrier to active 
participation. The perception that a treaty is not based on principles of fairness and 
equity can decrease the willingness of states to negotiate and ratify treaties. 
 
EU 
The legally binding reductions within the EU were first established under the 
Kyoto Protocol, but dropped even lower under the EU’s own 2008 energy-climate 
package. Cuts were greater for richer countries; poor countries were allowed 
increases, but at limited rates. The official language also references the need for 
differentiated obligations and transparency:  
“The European Council agreed that the best way to reach such ambitious 
goals was for every Member State to know what was expected, and for the 
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goals to be legally binding. This meant that the levers of government could be 
fully mobilized; and the private sector would have the long-term confidence 
required to justify the investment needed to transform Europe into a low-
carbon, high energy efficiency economy…the effort required of particular 
Member States and particular industries remains balanced and 
proportionate, and takes their own circumstances into account.”(COM (2008) 
30 final: 3) 
By taking individual circumstances into account, the EU actively pursues 
differentiated obligations. This is generally handled in two ways. On the one hand, 
we see a  “harmonized ETS covering the whole Union will be best suited to the 
internal market, with common rules to ensure a level playing field” (COM (2008) 30 
final: 6), which works well for the need for fairness and transparency. However, as 
the ETS, in 2008, only covered half of the necessary reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions, additional action was also necessary. According to the white paper, 
“some of this would be driven by EU measures – like tougher standards on CO2 
emissions from cars and fuel, and EU-wide rules to promote energy efficiency – but 
otherwise Member States would be free to determine where to concentrate their 
efforts, and what measures to bring into play to leverage change” (COM (2008) 30 
final: 7). Member states are thus able to meet strict standards in the most efficient 
way possible. This idea is further visited when flexibility is considered below.  
 Differentiated obligations take into account differences in capacity via the 
funding mechanisms outlined in the brief overview of EU history. The Financial 
Instrument for the Environment (LIFE) was established to co-finance environmental 
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objectives. Members who lack financial capacity receive grants, which are bound 
directly to climate-related efforts. Rather than simply receiving general funding, less 
developed countries receive targeted technical assistance. 
 
Explanations 
The UNFCCC has no history of a system to manage variation in capacity, 
whether financial or technical. The EU, on the other hand, relies on pooled 
resources. The Maastricht Treaty, which formally established the European Union, 
made two important moves that figure prominently in a discussion of institutional 
effectiveness. The 1993 treaty “assuaged the concerns of poorer member states by 
allowing temporary derogations and authorizing the Cohesion Fund to compensate 
them for environmental measures with disproportionately high costs” (Dinan 
2010).  Between 1961 and 2001, the European Union has made $324 billion in 
development grants to decrease economic, social, and environmental disparities 
(Anderson and Cavanaugh 2004). Pre-1992, funding mechanisms included: the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, the Competitiveness 
and Innovation Framework Programme, the European Fisheries Fund and the 
Seventh Framework Programme. All were used to cover environmental 
discrepancies that necessitated additional funding. In 1992, the Financial 
Instrument for the Environment (LIFE) was established to co-finance environmental 
objectives, specifically. An updated version, LIFE+ cites its general objective: 
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“To contribute to the implementation, updating and development of 
Community environmental policy and legislation, including the integration of 
the environment into other policies, thereby contributing to sustainable 
development. In particular, LIFE+ shall support the implementation of the 
6th EAP, including the thematic strategies, and finance measures and 
projects with European added value in 
Member States.” (Regulation (EC) No 614/2007: Article I) 
LIFE, and its current iteration, LIFE+, also demonstrate acknowledgement 
that joining countries will often have either higher or lower standards than the EU. 
With Sweden and Finland, both members since 1995, the former was the case. The 
EU allowed them to maintain their high standards, with the understanding that the 
region-wide standards would soon rise to meet their level. Indeed the 
aforementioned 1987 Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty specifically 
included a “policy of upward harmonization for health safety, and environmental 
regulations…and a general EU objective of environmental protection based on 
preventive action, reduction of damages at their source, and the ‘polluter-pays 
principle’” (Runge 1994: 36). The Amsterdam Treaty reinforced this decision, 
making clear that these exceptions were only valid if “proposed national measures 
were based on new scientific evidence and the problem was specific to the country 
proposing the exceptional measures” (Dinan 2010). The measures represent a key 
recognition of the need for flexibility and, at times, differentiated obligations. Indeed, 
“the Commission increasingly focuses on more flexible and less harmonization-
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oriented regulatory concepts, which allow the member states greater room to 
maneuver” (Knill and Liefferink 2007). 
 Central and Eastern European enlargement represented the opposite end of 
the spectrum. The EU started providing financial assistance to help the prospective 
new member states reach the high environmental standards in the 1990s. Notably, 
“the aid was sometimes conditional on the applicants taking certain steps, such as 
developing waste management plans” (Dinan 2010: 456). Bringing laggard states up 
to speed was thus largely a carrot-oriented approach. The prospect of economic 
benefits from integration, paired with specific funding, provided Central and 
Eastern European countries with an incentive to drive their environmental 
standards up. I argue that this is one of the most critical factors of EU success in 
environmental policymaking. Countries, out of a desire to receive the ample benefits 
from free trade, are willing to accept environmental requirements. The capacity 
issue is then directly addressed via financial incentives and technical assistance. 
This is a prime example of common yet differentiated obligations, and signals the 
strength of positive linkage (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001). By addressing capacity, 
and institutionalizing upward harmonization (Runge 1994), the EU goes against the 
typical ‘race to the bottom’ theory associated with trade and the environment. 
Through deep integration and carefully drafted agreements, the EU has established 
its ability to drive environmental standards up.  
 It is also important to note that, while the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol exempted 
developing countries from binding reductions, the EU included all relevant actors. 
The obligations under the EU plan are, therefore, common. The differentiation is 
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expressed in terms of how high the reduction targets are set, and compliance is 
augmented with funding and technical assistance. The UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol does 
not, in effect, have “common but differentiated obligations”. There are common 
goals, but the legal force of the actual obligations does not extend beyond the Annex 
I countries.   
 
Information and Flexibility 
UNFCCC 
The Preamble to the Convention notes, “that there are many uncertainties in 
predictions of climate change, particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and 
regional patterns thereof” (UNFCCC Preamble). The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol do 
well to attempt to mitigate uncertainty by largely basing its action on information 
gleaned from regular reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). The IPCC was created to provide the global community with scientific 
knowledge about climate change, and proves successful at doing just that. Indeed, 
the EU uses information from the IPCC as its main source.  
Article 6 of the UNFCCC, ‘Education, Training and Public Awareness’, asserts 
the need for public dissemination of information, and another proposed obligation 
seems to be geared at the issue of scientific uncertainty and information sharing: 
“promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including 
transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
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Protocol in all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, 
agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors” (UNFCCC Article 4:1c). The 
need for education and technology is reiterated in Article 5, which aims to enhance 
“international and intergovernmental efforts to strengthen systematic observation 
and national scientific and technical research capacities and capabilities” (UNFCCC 
Article 5), and again in Article 9, which establishes a subsidiary body for scientific 
and technological advice.  
Flexibility is vaguely referenced in relation to offering states leeway in the 
implementation phase: 
“In the implementation of their commitments under paragraph 2 above, a 
certain degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties 
to the Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a 
market economy.” (Article 4: 6) 
The lack of flexibility mechanisms became an earnest focus when the COP drafted 
the Kyoto Protocol. Emissions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
and Joint Implementation (JI) make up the arsenal of flexibility-enhancing 
provisions. The trading scheme allows for trade of emission permits between Annex 
I countries, the CDM, described earlier, allows for emission reduction projects in 
developing countries, and JI lets Annex I countries gain credit for projects in other 
Annex I countries. The mechanisms are designed to allow parties to meet their 
targets in the most efficient way possible. However, in practice, they may have 
“generated confusion at best and opened up opportunities for manipulation at 
worst” (Young 2010: 96).  
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Whether or not the flexibility mechanisms of the global climate regime prove 
adequate, it is clear that institutional flexibility is not properly accounted for. Indeed, 
we see the UNFCCC struggling to remain relevant. With scientific uncertainty and 
sudden changes possible, an adequate climate regime can be neither rigid nor 
incremental (Young 2010: 86). Article 15 (Amendments) institutionalizes the 
general lack of flexibility: 
“The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed 
amendment to the Convention by consensus.  If all efforts at consensus have 
been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last 
resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and 
voting at the meeting.” (UNFCCC Article 15: 3) 
 Article 20: 3 of the Kyoto Protocol mirrors the text of Article 15:3 of the 
UNFCCC. The preference is that all changes be made by consensus, and only when 
necessary should the parties resort to a three-fourths majority vote. Attempting to 
reach a consensus among 192 parties with divergent interests results in a rather 
rigid institution. Indeed, “The biophysical systems in question are dynamic and 
prone to fast changes, but the regime in place is sluggish and cannot respond 
adequately to shifts” (Young 2010: 116).  
 
EU 
In direct response to uncertainty, the EU has recognized the need for 
widespread information dissemination. Indeed, the 2008 plan included the creation 
of a Shared Environmental Information System (SEIS) (COM (2008) 46 final). Unlike 
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the UNFCCC’s vague mention of information sharing (UNFCCC Article 6), the EU 
created a concrete mechanism that takes into account: “common criteria like 
accuracy, validity, reliability, timeliness, relevance, completeness, comparability and 
coherence over time are relevant to all environmental information” (COM (2008) 46 
final: 1).   
The 2008 package also enhanced the key flexibility mechanism of the EU’s 
climate action plan. The Emission Trading System, originally initiated in 2005, was 
successful but suffered several key challenges. Demonstrating the institution’s 
ability to adapt, the new legislation expanded the scope of the trading scheme to 
include “greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide” and “all major industrial 
emitters” (COM (2009) 147 final: 6). Indeed, the Emission Trading System (ETS), 
prompted by the trading mechanism authorized under the Kyoto Protocol, is one of 
the most promising features of the EU’s climate action program. According to a 
study commissioned by the European Parliament: 
“Recent experience in using market-based instruments in environmental 
policy has demonstrated their ability to improve environmental performance 
in a cost-efficient way. Climate-related MBIs could also be effectively 
implemented in the context of trade policy, provided the appropriate 
institutional and legal frameworks are put in place.” 
(EXPO/B/INTA/2007/12: 2) 
By using market-based instruments, the EU is able to minimize the costs 
associated with reducing emissions. Indeed, “the Commission estimates that 
without the ETS costs to achieve Kyoto emission reduction targets could reach €6.8 
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billion annually. However, through the ETS, reduction targets can be achieved at an 
annual cost of €2.9 to €3.7 billion”(MEMO/06/452, 2006: 7). Indeed, strikingly, the 
EU has framed climate change policy as an opportunity for economic growth, rather 
than burden. The 2008 white paper “20 20 by 2020” includes the assertion that 
“change offers a stepping stone to modernize the European economy, orientating it 
towards a future where technology and society will be attuned to new needs and 
where innovation will create new opportunities to feed growth and jobs” (COM 
(2008) 30 final: 2). It goes on to note “a real potential to make climate-friendly 
policies a major driver for growth and jobs in Europe” (COM (2008) 30 final: 3). An 
emphasis is placed on the number of jobs associated with renewables and energy 
efficiency in both building and products. The focus on ‘eco-industry’ seems to drive 
the push to enact climate policy quickly and fully. This is fitting with the basic 
premise of the European Union: deep integration can benefit everyone. 
The EU’s ability to adapt is not limited to its intelligent and palatable framing 
of policies. The institution itself has proven able to respond to the sometimes-
unanticipated changes associated with climate change. Indeed, in addition to the 
official flexibility mechanisms, like the ETS, the EU itself has shown its ability to be a 
flexible institution. There is already effort going into planning how to move beyond 
a 20% cut in reductions (COM (2010) 265 final). And, on February 8th of 2013, the 
EU agreed to commit at least 20% of the entire EU budget from 2014-2020 to 
climate-related spending.  
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Explanations 
The argument could be made that cooperation and information sharing is 
easier to foster among homogeneous groups. Liberal states are considered more 
supportive of international institutions, and more apt to place a higher demand for 
environmental regulation (Raustiala and Victor 1998). In addition, epistemic 
communities are easier to establish among countries that share a particular, socially 
constructed, view of science (Jasanoff 1998). Is “a zone of collective management, 
marked by shared environmental problems and shared preferences for managing 
those problems” a natural result of small-scale management?  (Raustiala and Victor 
1998: 691). Regional institutions are ideal breeding grounds for epistemic 
communities. With a malign problem rife with scientific uncertainty, information 
and practice sharing is critical. Indeed, “epistemic communities have a larger role in 
world politics when there are complex problems with ambiguous linkages and 
outcomes” (Zito 2002, 243). 
Members of regional blocs are likely to have similar preferences, and thus 
could be strong conduits for policy diffusion. If Simmons et al are correct, 
“international policy diffusion occurs when government policy decisions in one 
country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in another 
country (sometimes mediated by the behaviour of international organizations or 
even private actors or organizations)” (Simmons et al 2006: 787). Regional trade 
agreements may facilitate such systematic conditioning, and, more importantly, do 
so in a context that holds proximity constant as it creates a strong epistemic 
community (Greenhill 2010). By creating communities focused on learning and 
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cooperation, rather than competition and coercion, regional trade agreements may 
be uniquely fitted to driving environmental standards up (Elkins and Simmons 
2005).  
The flexibility embedded in the EU relies, in part, on a small number of 
actors. The UNFCCC made clear that coordinating action to manage a problem with 
asymmetric externalities at a global level was complicated at best, impossible at 
worst. With 195 parties to the UNFCCC, and consensus or three-fourths voting the 
only options, it quickly becomes clear that changes will not come easily. The EU, and 
regional agreements more generally, benefit from relatively small sets of actors. To 
compare, the UNFCCC currently has 195 parties, the EU only 27. Institutional design 
theory tells us “large numbers raise questions about how to share both the costs and 
benefits of cooperation, especially when some actors are richer, bigger, or more 
powerful than others” (Koremenos et al 2001: 765). Actors will not act collectively 
unless the group is small or has selective incentives (Olson 1965, 1982). Aside from 
being a smaller sample of interests, the close proximity of member states in regional 
agreements yields greater possibilities for shared incentives. Indeed, trans-
boundary pollution is a more tangible concept when you share a border with the 
polluter (or upstream) state. Information sharing is also easier, particularly when 
there is a pre-existing network in place. EU countries are used to constant 
communication, making dissemination easier and allowing for greater ease when 
transmitting institutional changes. 
Had the EU not used flexibility mechanisms, such as the ETS and allowance of 
different methods to achieve emission reduction goals, participation in the climate 
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regime might have proved too costly for a number of the newer member states. Both 
formal flexibility mechanisms such as the ETS, and institutional flexibility are built 
into the EU framework. 
 
Leadership and Linkage 
UNFCCC 
 As mentioned above, Article 3 asks developed countries to serve as leaders: 
“the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change 
and the adverse effects thereof” (UNFCCC Article 3: 1). Its reference to leadership is 
correct, yet no country has yet filled the role of ‘leader’. It is clear that, despite the 
positive intentions, all developed countries will not come to the fore to fill this role. 
Indeed, it is not logical for all to serve as leaders. Strong domestic push for 
environmental politics, capacity, and power may lead a state, or group of states, to 
act as a hegemon (Young 1991). Among the 195 parties to the convention, we do not 
see a clear leader. 
 I argue that the nature of the UNFCCC may preclude coherent linkage. There 
are currently 195 parties to the convention. Coordinating an institution that a) has 
clear operational goals and b) appeals to all signatories is inherently difficulty when 
the number of actors is high (Koremenos et al 2001, Olson 1968). In theory, all 
parties do have a vested interest in ‘solving’ the problem of climate change. 
However, I argue that, in the face of asymmetric costs and benefits, that does not 
account for a great enough expression of shared incentives. The parties rely on each 
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other to differing degrees and may not see that aiding others is in their best interest. 
This idea becomes clearer in the analysis of the EU, where linkage to more benign 
issues (Underdal 2002a), or positive linkage, (Mitchell and Keilbach 2001), is strong.  
 The Kyoto Protocol did not improve the lack of leadership. However, it did 
work to enhance the sense of a community of shared interests, and incorporated the 
idea of positive linkage via its flexibility mechanisms. The CDM established a direct 
link between developed Annex I countries and developing. By giving Annex I 
countries credit for projects outside of their borders, the Kyoto Protocol reflects the 
global nature of the problem structure at hand. In addition, these projects are 
intended to increase economic growth and reduce emissions in developing 
countries. However, this top-down approach, and the fact that developing countries 
do not have binding targets, makes it challenging to create a coherent sense of 
community challenging. The actors who have signed differ greatly in how much they 
want to, and will, contribute to a solution. In addition, the refusal of countries who, 
perhaps, do not perceive themselves as victims, to ratify signals that all actors do 
not see the protocol as mutually gratifying. In order for positive linkage to function, 
all actors must feel that they will be better off with the treaty than without it or have 
an alternate incentive to join (Miles 2002: xiv).   
 
EU 
The focus on growth and jobs is apparent in a variety of papers, and 
emphasizes linkage to more benign problems. The 2007 green paper on adaptation 
points out “adaptation actions must be consistent with mitigation actions and vice 
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versa. These are also necessary to secure the benefits obtained from the Lisbon 
strategy for growth and jobs” (COM (2007) 354 final: 3). The corresponding white 
paper furthers this goal: “Enhancing the EU's resilience to the impacts of climate 
change also means the chance to invest in a low-carbon economy, for instance, by 
promoting energy efficiency and the uptake of green products” (COM (2009) 147 
final: 3). By 2010, “There is now a widespread consensus that the development of 
resource-efficient and green technologies will be a major driver of growth” (COM 
(2010) 265 final: 4). I argue that this framing is consistent with the original impetus 
of the EU, from the first days of integration as the European Coal and Steel 
Community. Economic interdependence serves as a rationale to enact powerful 
environmental policies. And while leaders like Sweden and Norway may jump at 
climate action due to a fundamental interest in ‘greening’ the environment, laggard 
states such as Spain and Ireland might find the prospect of economic growth more 
appealing. 
 According to the EU’s Climate Action Directorate General, “climate mitigation 
and adaptation actions will be mainstreamed into all the major EU programmes, in 
particular cohesion policy, energy and transport, research and innovation and by 
greening the Common Agricultural Policy” (Climate Action in the EU Budget). EU 
documents have continuously shown recognition that climate change is not a 
separate policy; it is one that must be integrated into all community actions. A 2012 
memo concerning the New Environment Action Programme builds on this 
approach: “past programmes tended to focus on specific environmental issues in 
isolation. The new approach is to consider how these issues are inter-related and 
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how improvements in one area can deliver multiple benefits not only for the 
environment but also for the economy and society” (MEMO/12/908, 2012). 
 
Explanations 
As stated above, with varied interests vying to compete in the UNFCCC, 
shared incentives are difficult to foster. While all countries may want to deter 
climate change, they have different costs and benefits associated with doing so. In 
addition, the sense of positive linkage created by the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol does 
not go as deep as that of the EU. In the EU, the desire to participate and comply has 
been driven by linkage: the perceived economic benefits of joining the bloc. While 
the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, most notably CDM, seek to increase 
efficiency, in Annex I countries, and growth, in developing countries, the regime as a 
whole is not framed as a source of economic progress and further integration. Some 
countries, taking issue with the structure of agreement and the lack of full 
participation, refuse to join. Yet in the EU, defection is not a possibility.  
It is necessary to note that, in the EU, the entire set of unilateral goals would 
not have been possible without full participation. Rather than exempt some 
members, the EU drew upon the funding made possible by the RTA itself to make 
sure that all relevant perpetrators were included. Designing an institution that 
includes all actors relies in part on linkage. Indeed, the EU “has a very deep set of 
linkages between integration and sustainable development” (Gallagher 2009: 295). 
Linkage in the EU climate change plan functions in two main ways. First, on a 
structural level, environmental protection must be integrated into a country’s 
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national policies in order for it to become a full member. It is thus inextricably 
linked to the EU as a whole. Second, the EU has framed climate change mitigation 
and adaptation policy not as a burden, but as a path to economic growth. Paired 
together, the two ensure that each member state will have the capacity and the 
desire to contribute to climate change progress. 
In terms of structural linkage, it is clear that the preferences of powerful 
states, their domestic constituencies, and the level of economic integration matter 
(Vogel 1997). Deep integration, as in the European Union, means that nations who 
act as leaders can convince their trading partners to strengthen their environmental 
policies. I argue that leader states can capitalize on the economic incentives present 
in trade agreements to drive environmental standards up. The role of leadership 
thus hinges on the ability to deliver a material good. Indeed, it has been argued that 
the key condition that powerful countries use to lure weaker ones into protecting 
their environment is access to the powerful countries' markets (Steinberg 1997). 
The EU functions on the basis of a full ‘acquis communautaire’. Member states, new 
or old, must incorporate the full set of EU directives into their national legislation. 
Therefore, laggard states that want to join the EU in order to enjoy the economic 
benefits must enhance their environmental regulations. Indeed, “the relatively less 
well-off European countries have improved their social and environmental 
situations while benefiting economically from integration” (Gallagher 2009: 295).  
The linkage utilized in the palatable framing of climate change action is just 
as significant. In the EU, unlike in the UNFCCC, we see the idea of environmental 
protection consistently paired with economic growth; a strikingly palatable framing, 
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the ‘sustainability frame’ (Lenschow and Zito 1998). EU directives and progress 
plans consistently reiterate that a low-carbon society yields benefits, not burdens; 
“there is now a widespread consensus that the development of resource-efficient 
and green technologies will be a major driver of growth” (COM (2010) 265 final: 4). 
The ‘sustainability frame’ capitalizes on structural linkage: member states are 
already invested in the economic health of the region as a whole. This is a key 
component of the managerial model of institutional management: there must be a 
starting assumption that the endeavor is a common enterprise (Chayes, Chayes, and 
Mitchell 1998: 49).  
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CHAPTER IV 
STATES AND STRUCTURES 
 
The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol have key successes, outlined above, but I 
argue that three main features are either absent or weak: linkage, enforcement, and 
flexibility. Young, focusing on the alignment of endogenous and exogenous factors in 
his assessment of the ‘misfit’ of the current climate regime, states that “what we face 
today is a problem featuring nonlinear and often unpredictable changes coupled 
with a regime that is sluggish and lacking in the nimbleness needed to address these 
changes” (Young 2010: 107). Treaties, like the environment, cannot be seen as 
static. Indeed, the “cure must match the disease” (Underdal 2002b: 469).  
Although the UNFCCC does address leadership, information, differentiated 
obligations, monitoring, and transparency, I argue that it does not go far enough. The 
clear main issue with the UNFCCC was the lack of concrete operational goals. 
Numerous studies have already noted that specific obligations make compliance 
more likely (Chayes and Chayes 1992). Clear commitments translate into specific 
actions, flexibility can allow for deep cooperation while minimizing the fear of 
retaliation (Koremenos et al 2001), and “learning by doing” (Victor and Skolnikoff 
687) can lead to innovative changes. The Kyoto Protocol recognized the lack of strict 
obligations, and made emission reduction targets binding. However, the lack of 
strong enforcement and “common but differentiated obligations” weakened the 
impact.  
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Here it is important to note the distinction between structural realities of the 
two institutions and strong policymaking. The EU did not choose to have strong 
leadership and a small number of actors, nor did the climate change regime involve 
an ad-hoc creation of deep political and economic integration. However, the decision 
to enact broad unilateral goals was a choice that, in effect, was made viable by its 
structural reality. The global climate regime could not rely on a small number of 
actors. In order to create a successful international agreement, it needed to include 
all perpetrators (Miles 2002: xiii). The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol had to work 
within the confines of the fragmentation of international society. However, there 
were choices, for example, the decision to not make binding reduction requirements 
for developing countries. Below, I attempt to distinguish between structure and 
policymaking.  
It is clear that key features have consistently shaped environmental policy in 
the European Union, most notably: strong leadership, differentiated obligations 
(acknowledging capacity limitations), and flexibility. In addition, desire to 
participate and comply has been driven by linkage: the perceived economic benefits 
of joining the EU. I have established that the EU has all of the institutional features 
that I previously deemed necessary for the management of a malign problem. With 
incentives to take no unilateral action without global consensus to do the same, why 
does the EU develop a highly functional institutional response? While the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol and the EU were faced with the same malign 
characteristics, the former has struggled to develop the institutional strength 
necessary to enact meaningful change.  
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 What the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol lacked (linkage, enforcement, and 
flexibility), the EU embraced. In order to attempt to understand why, I consider two 
levels of explanations: state-based, and RTA. The former is a more nuanced 
formulation of the idea that rich countries with green politics want to contribute to 
climate change progress. The latter, RTA-specific, argument suggests that the deep 
level of cooperation seen in the policies outlined above would not have been 
possible without a strong history of economic and political integration. As stated 
above, I work to determine whether the successes of the EU are a result of structure 
or adept policymaking. I then ask whether the institutional-level features of the EU 
are specific to the region, or whether they have the potential to be considered in 
other RTAs.  
 
European States 
 The political and economic environment in the EU cannot be discounted; “all 
international politics has domestic roots” (Koremenos et al 2001: 1070). Strong 
climate action in the EU is, in part, a result of domestic politics, public opinion and 
economic capacity of certain member states (Vogel and Kessler 1998). Indeed, 
culture, economy, and leadership matter (Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998).  The 
bottom-up approach suggests the need to consider that “the development of 
international environmental regimes most likely mirrors this positive shift in basic 
values, policy priorities, and institutional capacity at the domestic level—although 
probably with some time lag” (Underdal 2002b: 439). While I reject the reductionist 
assumption that green, well-off states will necessarily unilaterally address climate 
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change, these aspects do play a role. I determine which of the necessary institutional 
features are exogenous, or more related to the characteristics of EU member states 
and focus on two key aspects: leadership and economy. While important factors, I 
argue that neither could be considered, whether on their own or as a group, the 
ultimate cause of EU climate policy. Indeed, leadership is necessary but not 
sufficient (Young 1991) and wealth only came into play when it was pooled and 
distributed by the institution.  
 Leadership has always been an important aspect of environmental 
policymaking in the European Union. As explained above, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark (the green troika) took the initiative to push the 
environment to the forefront of the Single European Act in 1987. Sweden, Norway, 
and Germany led the fight for acid rain legislation. Indeed, “faced with the numerous 
potential hurdles of the EU process, any effort at policy innovation requires 
leadership on the part of actors” (Zito 2002:243). Denmark and the Netherlands, 
states with traditions of using economic instruments in their environmental policy 
agendas, initiated carbon taxes in 1992 (Zito 2002: 246). While at first the 
Commission wanted the Dutch and the Danes to drop the taxes, they ultimately 
decided that the best way to prevent disruption of the EU market was to put in place 
a EU-wide carbon tax. This is consistent with the general principle, established 
under the Maastricht Treaty, that policies should harmonize upward (Runge 1994). 
However, upward harmonization requires entrepreneurial member states to drive 
their own standards up, revealing “the central role of national governments and 
their articulation of specific interests in the process” (Zito 2002: 252). The carbon 
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tax demonstrates that a “unilateral policy choice made by the strong actor alters the 
structure of opportunities facing other societies” and “may generate and strengthen 
domestic demands within weaker nations for making adaptive adjustments in their 
own policies” (Underdal 2002a: 30).  
The last point attributed to characteristics of the member states themselves 
is economy. Climate change mitigation and adaptation is a costly endeavour, with 
uneven distribution of costs and benefits. Indeed, financial capacity must play a role. 
The Kuznets curve suggests that as a country’s economy grows, so will demand for 
environmental protection (Grossman and Krueger 1993). With material concerns 
out of the way, wealthy liberal states have the time, and capacity, to care about the 
natural world. However, as mentioned above, the EU is no longer a coalition of rich, 
green countries. Enlargement has meant greater asymmetries, both economically 
and politically. In this context, the EU has responded with financial support for less 
well-off countries. Indeed, fulfilling the desires of leaders sometimes requires 
paying the participatory costs of developing states (Raustiala and Victor 1998). The 
history of pooling common resources made the necessary differentiated obligations 
of the EU climate regime possible.   
  
European Union and Regional Trade 
 As is evident in the analysis above, leadership and economy cannot be 
credited with single handedly resulting in unilateral EU action. Indeed, they require 
an institution in order to be effective. I argue that key institutional characteristics 
were made possible by the regional, and trade-oriented, institution: information, 
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differentiated obligations, flexibility, monitoring/enforcement, and linkage. By 
keeping the number of actors small, establishing shared incentives, and 
mainstreaming economic and political integration, the EU demonstrates that the 
institution, not the characteristics of the individual states, made a coherent climate 
change regime possible. Indeed, the structure of the RTA itself facilitated 
cooperation by taking advantage of pre-existing linked incentives. These features 
are not lessons in institutional design; rather, they suggest that capitalizing on pre-
existing structures can result in more coherent policy. 
I argue that it is the strength of the idea that economic integration would 
support political peace and cooperation that led the EU to eventually include 
environmental policy.  The origin of the EU dates back to the 1945 formation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The arrangement arose out of a 
tumultuous economic and political situation post-World War II. There was a need to 
establish a coherent policy towards Germany, facilitate reconstruction and recovery, 
and enhance regional security. Coal had long been a vital resource for the recovery 
of industry, and France, committed to modernization, needed stable access. 
Germany needed forgiveness, and reintegration. The 1950 Schuman Plan, 
masterminded by Jean Monnet, gave both what they wanted. Using economic 
mechanisms, policies, and institutions, the plan set the stage for lasting integration. 
The logic is directly relevant to the question of what a regional trade agreement can 
offer. Logistically, the ECSC meant a common market in coal and steel that drove 
economic growth and promoted competition. However, it did much more. Jean 
Monnet envisioned deep integration that would eventually blend into other sectors 
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of society. Most importantly, it established a precedent of supra-nationality 
(member states agreed to cede some of their sovereignty to a ‘High Authority’) and 
made clear that there would be a foundation of shared incentives and linkage (Dinan 
2010:4, 19).  
Prior to the 1970s, the EU had almost no environmental policies to speak of. 
Jordan describes that a  “trickle of legislation turned into a stream” during the 1980s 
(Jordan 2002). The First Action Program was approved in 1973, with the goal of 
improving “the setting and quality of life, and the surroundings and living conditions 
of the Community population” (Hildebrand 2002). The Second, in 1976, expanded 
on the first, emphasized rational use of the environment, and prioritized reduction 
of water pollution. The Third fully incorporated the values of the former two into all 
Community objectives, and formally established the environmental impact 
assessment procedure, along with concrete directives. By 1987 the Fourth 
Environmental Action Program, under the Single European Act, had established 
harmonization across the member states and essentially granted the European 
Commission power to regulate the environment under the “polluter-pays” principle 
(Holzinger et al 2009: 49). These steps are crucial, given that eliciting compliance 
requires a foundation of norms (Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell 1998).  
 The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 furthered the goals of the Single European Act. 
It aimed to further sustainability and maintain high levels of protection. To reach 
this goal, the treaty required that policy use the precautionary principle, ensuring 
that preventive action should be taken to protect the environment. As established in 
the Third Environmental Action Program, environmental protection requirements 
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had to be integrated into all other Community policies (Wilkinson 2002). Although 
there was pushback against centralized environmental policy throughout the 1990s, 
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty solidified the region’s commitment to the environment 
by formally introducing the idea of sustainable development. The environment was 
thus inextricably bound to what had been stipulated as an economic arrangement.  
Proximity and number alone do not lead to a functional institution. Economic 
and political integration lie at the heart of the EU’s successful institutional design. 
The depth of integration, in part, allowed the EU to enact ambitious, legally binding, 
climate goals. However, such a statement would suggest that any regional trade 
agreement, bound by economic and political linkage, could do the same. Here I turn 
to policies that distinguish the EU from other RTAs. The historical account of EU 
integration makes clear that strong funding mechanisms were a key component of 
enlargement. Central and Eastern European countries received assistance even 
before they were official member states. The goal was to help potential joiners, who 
were crippled with incapacity, reach the high EU standards.  
We see this rationale carried into the climate change program. Had the EU 
not used flexibility mechanisms, such as the ETS and allowance of different methods 
to achieve emission reduction goals, participation in the climate regime might have 
proved too costly for a number of the newer member states. Both formal flexibility 
mechanisms such as the ETS, and institutional flexibility are built into the EU 
framework. In addition, laggard states were eligible for funding via LIFE+ and the 
Cohesion Fund. The institution recalibrated the costs and benefits of climate change 
cooperation to make possible deeper levels of change. Cooperative practice sharing 
 46
and funding arrangements are better suited to issues of noncompliance due to lack 
of capacity, where, in fact, “coercive sanctions are not only ineffective but inherently 
unsuitable” (Chayes, Chayes, and Mitchell 1998: 41). In response to the pressure of 
strong leader states, paired with a system suited to dealing with incapacities, the EU 
has institutionalized a practice of upward harmonization (Runge 1994). 
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CHAPTER V 
APPLICATIONS 
 
If the institutional successes of the EU are specific to the region, the 
structural explanations (the EU got lucky with leadership and wealth) win out over 
the institutional design elements (RTAs facilitate information sharing, differentiated 
obligations, flexibility, monitoring/enforcement, and linkage) argument. If the 
institutional design elements are available in other contexts, however, the lessons 
learned here may be transferable to other RTAs. Below I attempt to determine what 
lessons emerge from the European example that might be generalizable 
intellectually and transferable in terms of policy to other regions, offering Mercosur 
as an alternate case study. I consider which aspects are benefits of working within 
the framework of an RTA and which can be attributed to intelligent policymaking.  
The EU has never been a normal trade agreement. Runge points out several 
unique characteristics: “the EU has addressed the linkages between trade and 
environment directly, and has been active in setting environmental policies and 
resolving trade-environment disputes” (Runge 1994: 35). Runge goes on to draw 
attention to three key institutional characteristics of the EU. First, member countries 
allow the European Commission to take responsibility for environmental policy, 
civil protection, and nuclear safety (supra-nationality). Second, the EU has funds to 
assist member countries with environmental provisions (aiding compliance, and 
allowing for differentiated obligations). And lastly, EU members are close in 
proximity and trade at high levels. According to Runge, this “strengthens the case for 
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greater harmonization, and makes problems of transnational pollution more 
obvious” (Runge 1994: 36). This third characteristic fits closely with the logic of 
policy diffusion, which, indeed, suggests that proximity can contribute to the 
formation of epistemic communities (Greenhill 2010). If the EU is as unique as 
Runge suggests, are its successes also a rarity?  
As established in the section above, certain critical characteristics that made 
the EU successfully enact unilateral goals may be attributed to its status as an RTA. I 
argue that four main features are worth examining: information, differentiated 
obligations, flexibility, monitoring/enforcement, and linkage. However, I also consider 
the possibility that other RTAs will have difficulty replicating the strong leadership 
and pooling the generous funding that made differentiated obligations possible. It is 
also important to note that the EU benefited from a relatively long history of 
integration, and that the idea of ceding sovereignty to a central institution was not 
new. Here I consider Mercosur as a regional trade agreement that has neither the 
deep history nor the economic capacity of the EU. It was formed as a vehicle for 
growth, not, as in the EU, as a system of deep political and economic integration. The 
goal was to figure out “how the environment can be protected without affecting 
growth rates and the liberalization of trade” (Tussie 2000: 1).  However, I argue that 
while the economy may have taken front stage, the impetus for environmental 
protection is still there. Indeed, the preamble states: “believing that this objective 
must be achieved by making optimum use of available resources, preserving the 
environment…” (Mercosur: Preamble). 
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In counter to the claim that “all the environmental components of the 
agreement are weak, and have even been downgraded in recent years” (Hochstetler 
2003: 1), the 1999 near-collapse of Mercosur and the corresponding skepticism 
about neoliberalism may have created an institutional climate more suited to deep 
regional integration and regulation that, in turn, may allow more environmental 
components to be integrated and existing ones to be strengthened. Indeed, the post-
1999 iteration of Mercosur seems poised to incorporate several of the key features 
outlined above. The post-crisis reframing of Mercosur created a powerful 
opportunity to expand the scope of the agreement and “infuse the organization with 
a social dimension” (Parton 2011, 135). In 2001, only two years after the crisis, an 
“Environmental Framework Agreement expanded and specified the environmental 
aims of Mercosur” (Hochstetler 2003: 13). The preamble signals a heightened 
commitment to the environment: “considering that trade and environmental 
policies should complement one another to ensure sustainable development within 
the Southern Common Market (Mercosur)”, they were “convinced of the importance 
of a legal framework to facilitate the effective protection of the environment and the 
sustainable use of natural resources by the States Parties”(Environmental 
Framework Agreement; Preamble). In 2004, the Specialized Meeting of 
Environment Ministers was established. That same year, the Common Market 
Council adopted Decision 14/04: “the Additional Protocol of the Mercosur 
Framework Agreement on the Environment in the field of cooperation and 
assistance in the event of environmental emergencies”. 
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The recent history outlined above suggests that the political bodies of 
Mercosur “have demonstrated a capacity to forge regional norms and enhance 
economic integration” (Parton 2011: 133). However, the intergovernmental focus 
and resistance to ceding sovereignty undercuts some of the ability to coordinate 
regional cooperation (Parton 2011, Hochstetler 2003). I argue that climate change 
progress at the regional level is likely to be challenging, but not impossible. Indeed, 
all the Mercosur member states have signed the Kyoto Protocol, and developed an 
Ad hoc Group on Climate Change (GAHCC) (Red Mercosur WP N° 3-2010, 12). Yet it 
is clear that more work needs to be done. Mercosur, because of the structure 
inherent to an RTA, is embedded with shared incentives, at least at the economic 
level. In addition, the move away from neoliberalism and corresponding call for 
more state intervention and an enhanced focus on social cohesion opened up 
political space for Mercosur to broaden its scope (Phillips 2001). 
If the inherent structure of regional trade agreements, exemplified by the EU, 
lends itself to binding obligations, their treatment of climate change needs more 
careful analysis. Here I note that, as shown above with the case of Mercosur, 
economic integration may be necessary, not but sufficient, for strong institutional 
design. The linkage to economic growth is clear, as is the ability to distribute 
information via pre-existing networks. Differentiated obligations prove more 
challenging to replicate, as they require a central mechanism capable of distributing 
assistance (financial and technical). The EU had this for two main reasons: 1) 
member states agreed to cede some amount of sovereignty to the institution and 2) 
some countries were wealthy enough to generate a more than adequate quantity of 
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structural funds for the less wealthy. The first is transferrable to other cases if the 
actors concede; the second is not always. Mercosur does not have the financial 
capacity necessary, nor would the environment be a likely top concern. Different 
stages of development reflect different priorities.  
Flexibility, as described earlier, is necessary on two levels: flexibility 
mechanisms and institutional flexibility. I argue that, while the former requires 
coherent policymaking, the latter may be built into successful RTAs. The EU and the 
Kyoto Protocol both include emissions trading in an effort to allow countries to 
meet reduction targets as efficiently as possible. While not inherent to the structure 
of the RTA, the institutionalized trade relations should, in theory, make the 
establishment of an emissions trading system easier. Institutional flexibility should, 
likewise, be less challenging within the framework of a trade agreement. Trade 
relations require constant change, due to regular evaluations of barriers to trade 
and shifting situations of political economy among the member states. In theory, this 
argument should also lend itself to efficient monitoring/enforcement. Trade 
partners require institutional transparency, and regular reporting of tariff levels is 
the norm. However, requiring states to comply with environmental rules also 
requires a deep level of political integration. The full ‘acquis communautaire’ of the 
EU is not found in Mercosur. Member states still interact on an intergovernmental 
level, and maintain a high degree of autonomy. 
It is clear that there is no deterministic link between regional trade 
agreements and successful climate change regimes. I argue that there is a need for a 
strong institutional foundation, economic capacity to include a system of 
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management that acknowledges divergent levels of capacity, and willingness to 
allow a central body to maintain a moderate degree of authority. However, linkage 
and information sharing, two necessary institutional features are embedded in 
RTAs. In addition, differentiated obligations, flexibility, and monitoring/enforcement 
should be easier to foster when there is already a history of economic integration 
and shared incentives. The EU’s financial mechanisms allowed for the transfer of 
funds, and technical assistance, to member states with limited capacity. The 
development of a common market necessitated monitoring and enforcement. And 
maintaining an institution that managed political and economic shifts contributed to 
a flexible framework. More research is needed to determine if these features could 
be effectively fostered in another region.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Climate change is plagued with the fear of free riding, asymmetry, scientific 
uncertainty, and inherent interdependencies (Miles et al 2002, Rittel and Webber 
1973, Levin et al 2012, Lazarus 2009). An institution properly fit to mitigate such 
malign characteristics requires key features: leadership, linkage, quality information, 
differentiated obligations, monitoring/enforcement, transparency, and flexibility 
(Miles et al 2002, Koremenos et al 2001, Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998). I use the 
UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol and EU as lessons in institutional dynamics. An analysis of 
the relative successes and failures of each suggests that coordination within a 
regional trade agreement may facilitate deeper progress. While I do not suggest that 
RTAs can serve as a substitute for global cooperation, they may be able to make 
valuable contributions to the overall “regime complex” that attempts to mitigate the 
harmful social and environmental impacts of climate change. Indeed, “regional 
organizations at their core are institutionalized means of enhancing cooperation 
amongst nation-states” (Parton 2011, 134).  
When faced with the same problem structure, a global regime (exemplified 
here by the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol) developed a different breed of institution 
than that championed by a regional counterpart (represented by the EU). The 
UNFCCC, and the Kyoto Protocol that followed, suffer from structural obstacles: an 
unwieldy number of actors, splintered interests, and institutional rigidity. In spite of 
these challenges, the global climate regime has succeeded at transmitting scientific 
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information and incorporating flexibility mechanisms. Reports from the IPCC have 
fundamentally shifted the global body of climate change knowledge, and have 
informed the policymaking decisions of the EU. However, it has fallen short on other 
fronts. All relevant actors are not included, the obligations may be too differentiated, 
those countries that have ratified are falling short of their reduction targets, and 
there is confusion as to where to go next. Choosing to not include developing 
countries in the pact of binding reductions not only alienated countries that 
perceived the agreement as unfair, but also did little to acknowledge the financial 
and technical capacity issues. The Clean Development Mechanism is fraught with the 
risk of fraud and exploitations. While the strong incorporation of information and 
flexibility mechanisms is a testament to international cooperation, I find the global 
regime lacking in linkage, enforcement, and flexibility. 
Coordination at the regional level is, clearly, easier. Regional trade 
agreements mean that a small number of actors, in relatively close proximity, will 
have at least some shared incentives due to economic (and often political) 
integration. This thesis explores the possibility that regional cooperation may 
benefit from enhanced policy diffusion (proximity, information sharing), linkage to 
more pressing concerns (the economy), and the enforcement capacity of a 
centralized institution. I argue that these arrangements have the ability to impact 
social cohesion, or “the glue that binds society together” (Capshaw, 2005, 53). The 
EU performs much better than the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol in almost all key areas:  
leadership, information sharing, differentiated obligations, flexibility, 
monitoring/enforcement, and linkage. The pre-existing structure of deep political 
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and economic integration meant that countries are obligated to comply with the full 
acquis communautaire, which includes climate change policy. And, if capacity is an 
issue, members are eligible for LIFE funding due to the history of pooling common 
resources. The institution of the EU, in existence since the early 1950s, is also 
capable of adapting. The enforcement mechanism has been strengthened, and is 
supported by the European Court of Justice; the trading system (ETS) now includes 
all greenhouse gases; climate action has been mainstreamed into all other EU 
policies; and an information-sharing program (SEIS) was established. 
Although these successes are promising, a regional trade agreement does not 
necessarily include strong climate change policy. The case of Mercosur 
demonstrates that an intergovernmental focus and resistance to ceding sovereignty 
undercuts some of the ability to coordinate regional cooperation (Parton 2011, 
Hochstetler 2003).  The strong institutional history of the EU, its leadership, and the 
relative wealth of its countries made strong policymaking much more feasible. 
However, while certain features may be unique to the EU experience, I argue that 
many aspects of the EU’s institutional design merit further investigation. Some 
characteristics are inherent to the structure of RTAs (information, linkage) and 
other lessons learned from the EU may be transferrable (differentiated obligations, 
flexibility, and monitoring/enforcement). Leader states can capitalize on the 
economic incentives present in trade agreements to drive environmental standards 
up. In addition, countries may be more apt to adopt strict regulations when, in 
exchange, they receive concrete financial benefits. The EU’s style of framing climate 
change action as a path to economic growth made regulation more palatable. In 
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addition, access to a free trade area means that a classically laggard state may 
consider the costs of environmental protection less foreboding when there are 
anticipated benefits that may be even greater. The research here suggests that the 
EU successfully recalibrated the distribution of the costs and benefits of acting on 
climate change. The ability to do so resulted, in large part, from pre-existing 
institutions.  
 I do not seek to demonstrate that a regional institution is better than the 
global climate regime. I work to assess whether regional trade agreements can fill in 
gaps in coordination that are inevitable when one institution attempts to tackle a 
problem that does not adhere to geopolitical boundaries. A complex global problem 
with upstream/downstream asymmetries cannot be matched with a single solution. 
Rather, a network of solutions is needed to begin to alter the way countries design 
and implement meaningful systems of change.  
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